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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 13-3080 
____________ 
 
JOSE CRISTOBAL CARDONA, 
        Appellant 
v. 
 
JEFFREY THOMPSON 
 __________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 3-12-cv-00819) 
District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 24, 2013 
 
Before:  RENDELL, GREENAWAY, JR. and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 26, 2013) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellant Jose Cardona, a federal prisoner, appeals from an order of the District 
Court denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
affirm. 
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 Cardona, who was then incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary in 
Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, in 
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  In this petition, 
he challenged the Bureau of Prisons’ decision to place and keep him in the Special 
Management Unit (“SMU”).  He claimed that Program Statement 5217.01, pursuant to 
which he was placed in the SMU, was promulgated in violation of the Administrative 
Procedures Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 553; that the BOP in placing him in the SMU 
improperly imposed an additional sentencing requirement on him; and that he has lost 
120 days of Good Conduct Time as a result of his SMU placement.  The District Court 
stayed the action pending Cardona’s appeal in Cardona v. Bledsoe, D.C. Civ. No. 10-cv-
02650, another of his habeas corpus petitions.  In that case, we eventually held that  
Cardona’s claim that the BOP placed him in the SMU in retaliation for filing numerous 
lawsuits did not concern the execution of his sentence and thus his habeas corpus petition 
was properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, see Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533 (3d 
Cir. 2012).  The stay in the instant habeas corpus action then was lifted, the Magistrate 
Judge recommended dismissal, and, in an order entered on June 20, 2013, the District 
Court, noting our decision in Cardona v. Bledsoe, dismissed the instant petition because 
Cardona’s claims would not alter the fact or duration of his sentence. 
 Cardona appeals.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 & 2253(a).  We 
review de novo the District Court’s dismissal of the habeas corpus petition on 
jurisdictional grounds.  See Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 119 (3d Cir. 2002).  
In his Informal Brief, Cardona argues that his “forced participation” in the SMU has 
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acted as an additional sentencing requirement that was not intended by the sentencing 
court; that participation in the SMU is voluntary and cannot be compelled through loss of 
Good Conduct Time; that a failure to hear his case would result in a suspension of the 
writ; and that the BOP violated the notice and comment requirements of the APA in 
promulgating P.S. 5217.01. 
We will affirm.  In recommending dismissal of the section 2241 petition, the 
Magistrate Judge reasoned, and the District Court agreed, that jurisdiction was lacking to 
the extent that Cardona, in reality, was challenging the conditions of his confinement and 
not the execution of his sentence, see Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 
2002).  Moreover, contrary to his assertions, SMU placement was entirely consistent with 
the sentencing court’s recommendation that Cardona be incarcerated at a high-level 
security prison.   
 The District Court properly dismissed Cardona’s latest federal habeas corpus 
petition for lack of jurisdiction.  Cardona was sentenced in the District of Minnesota to a 
term of imprisonment of 40 years, following his convictions for controlled substance 
violations.  At sentencing, the District Judge recommended that he serve his sentence at 
USP Florence, or some other high security prison.  As we noted in Cardona v. Bledsoe, 
after being transferred to USP Lewisburg, Cardona was referred to the SMU, which 
limits an inmate’s contact with other inmates until he demonstrates the potential for 
positive community interaction, 681 F.3d at 534 (discussing P.S. 5217.01).  The record 
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here shows that the BOP referred Cardona to the SMU based on his history of disruptive 
behavior.
1
 
In his most recent habeas corpus petition, Cardona again challenged his placement 
in the SMU, but habeas corpus may not be used to challenge the conditions of 
confinement.  See Leamer, 288 F.3d at 542.  Here, Cardona did not contest the legality of 
his conviction or the fact or length of his sentence.  His claims concerning his placement 
in the SMU are essentially “conditions of confinement” claims because the relief he seeks 
would not alter his sentence or undo his conviction.  See id. at 542-44.  In his petition, 
Cardona claimed that the BOP violated his right to due process by placing him in the 
SMU in order to force him to renounce his associations, but, as we recently explained, in 
order to challenge the execution of his sentence under section 2241, he would, at a 
minimum, have to show that the BOP’s conduct is inconsistent with a command or 
recommendation of the sentencing court, Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d at 537.  Cardona 
has not made that showing here.  There is nothing in the criminal judgment prohibiting 
his placement in the SMU or even mentioning the SMU.  See id.  His request to 
invalidate the procedures used to confine him in the SMU also is a “conditions of 
confinement” claim because, again, success for him would mean at most release into the 
general population; it would not mean a shorter stay in prison or placement in the 
                                              
1
 The administrative record reveals that Cardona was placed in the SMU because he 
participated in gang-related activity and because he has a history of serious and disruptive 
disciplinary infractions. 
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community.  Accordingly, section 2241 is not available to Cardona to bring the APA 
claim either.
2
   
Last, we decline to consider Cardona’s contention on appeal that it would violate 
the Suspension Clause in his case to deprive him of this potential avenue of relief.  See 
generally Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 746 (2008) (“The Court has been careful 
not to foreclose the possibility that the protections of the Suspension Clause have 
expanded along with post-1789 developments that define the present scope of the writ.”).  
Although Cardona discussed the Suspension Clause in his reply, see Docket Entry No. 
17, he did not include a Suspension Clause claim in his section 2241 petition, and the 
District Court did not address a Suspension Clause argument.  See, e.g., Newark Morning 
Ledger Co. v. United States, 539 F.2d 929, 932 (3d Cir. 1976) (“We generally refuse to 
consider issues that are raised for the first time on appeal.”).  In any event, we seriously 
doubt that the Suspension Clause has been violated in Cardona’s case because an 
adequate substitute for the writ exists in the form of a Bivens
3
 action, which may 
generally be used to raise “conditions of confinement” claims.  Cf. Abernathy v. Wandes, 
713 F.3d 538, 555 (10th Cir. 2013) (under Boumediene, statutory remedy may serve as 
                                              
2
 Although a claim of loss of Good Conduct Time sounds in habeas corpus because the 
loss would affect the duration of the inmate’s sentence, Woodall v. Federal Bureau of 
Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2005), the District Court did not err in declining to 
treat Cardona’s assertion of a loss of 120 days as a separate, cognizable claim.  The 
allegation was pled not as a separate claim but as an example of the conditions of 
confinement relating to SMU placement.  See Petitioner’s Objections, at 4 (The “SMU 
Program is . . . designed to defraud prisoners of good conduct credit by and through 
conspiratorially planned disciplinary actions.”). 
 
3
 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Officers, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
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adequate substitute for habeas writ, so long as it sufficiently entitles prisoner to 
meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held in violation of law).   
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court denying 
Cardona’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
